Peaceful Conflict Resolution in Northern Uganda: A Possibility

Mr James Basil Okee-Obong

Abstract

For over 2 decades now, the land of Acoli has been drenched with blood. It has not known any form of peace. Destructive conflicts in Uganda have turned Acoliland, with the most diverse kind of resources, into a land unable to turn its wealth into opportunities for development. The situation has worsened in the last 12 years.

Although attempts have been made to end the conflict through military might, negotiations, for example, the Nairobi Peace Jokes of 1985-6, the Pece Accord of 1988, the Addis Ababa Understanding of 1990, the aborted Awach Peace talks of 1994, various bilateral negotiations and Acoli peace initiatives, but all these efforts have not yielded any positive outcomes. War still rages on, people still continue to die in their hundreds and property worth millions of shillings are constantly being destroyed, children can’t go to school, health units are dysfunctional, AIDS is stamping its ugliest mark ever on mankind, etc. Above all, the majority of the population have been uprooted and sent to live in „protected villages", in the name of their safety, thus, destroying the very foundation of Acoli culture and civilisation.

Various voices of reason have cried out for peace talks, but all these cries have fallen on deaf hears. The NRM/UPDF and LRA/M have stuck to their guns. They want peace from the muzzle of the gun and on their own terms, and in so doing, spelling more death and suffering for the people of Acoli and Uganda as a whole. It is the factors to this empasse that the paper examines with the view of proposing some solutions for the removal of the obstacles to peace in the region.

The paper has focuses on 6major obstacles to peace. Namely: Past experiences, poor communication, autopoeitic nature of the conflict, unclear northern Uganda policy, legitimised violence, and lack of a legitimate viable Acoli entity to spear head Acoli cause.

The discussion is presented in four parts. Part one, provides an over view of the problem, origin and responsibility. Part two, deals with a brief review of the theories of why men wage war and thereafter discusses the obstacles to negotiated peace. In part three, is discussed positive signs for peaceful resolution of the conflict and ways of how to resolve the problem. Lastly, in part four, is the summary and conclusion.

Key words: Conflict, Autopoeisis, Acoli entity, communication.

1.0 Overview of the problem

For over 2 decades now, the land of Acoli has been drenched with blood. It has not known any form of peace, be it physical, psychological or social. Directly or indirectly, destructive conflicts in Uganda and in the world (e.g., world wars I & II, Mau Mau rebellion, Amin era, UNLA liberation war, Luwero Triangle and Yumbe wars, etc) have turned Acoliland, with the most diverse kind of resources, into a land unable to turn its wealth into opportunities for development.

The situation has worsened in the last 12 years. Over 300.000 people have been displaced (Wasswa, 1998); An unknown number of people have died of various causes directly or indirectly related to war; thousands have been maimed, tortured or harassed; over 5.000 to 10.000 children have been abducted (AI, 1998). Using a pessimistic UPDF’s officially reported rate of killing LRA rebels, i.e., an average of 50 - 100 (75) per month: this means that in the last 24 months alone, they have killed 1.800 Acoli child soldiers. On the other hand, using a pessimistic estimate of 25 persons killed by LRA per week (source: Gulu District Security Committee - see the Monitor of Mon. 07.07.98 - Apunyu, 1998), we see that in the last 24 months alone, they have killed about 2.400 people. The sum total of Acoli killed by the two groups in the last 24 months alone is 4.200! The differentials in the number of Acolis each force has killed in the last 24 months is only 400 (14%)! The war has raged on for the last 12 years, this means that they have already killed off about 4% of the total population (25.200/700.000- (pop. figure from MoEP,1991)).

To rub salt onto injuries, countless number of people have been sexually abused. The socio-cultural fabric - traditional family structures - of the society has been disrupted. Property worth billions of shillings have been destroyed. People have no access to land and have to live on handouts from the good will of the government or the international community. Children cannot go to school because the schools have either been destroyed or the teachers killed, the health units are non-functional. AIDS is raring its head in its most severe form ever in Uganda here. From a recent voluntary screening of the population of Gulu town by the AIDS Control Unit in the district, it was established that about 75% of the sample were HIV+. This very high prevalence of AIDS in the region has been attributed to the heavy deployment of troops in the region (Apunyu, 1998). While the majority of Ugandans wallop in poverty, the scarce financial resources is being used to purchase arms rather than productive equipment. And lastly, politics has been corruptly monetarised and militarised.

1.2 Roots of the Armed Conflict

Several socio-economic and political factors are responsible for the onset and continued armed conflict in Acoli and they have been well documented in other papers and writings. While the NRM stalwarts argue that Acoli are fighting for "lost glory", a workshop of all Resistance Councillors (RCs- now Local Councillors), from Aswa County organised by the then Member of the NRC, Hon. George Abola in 1990, identified 22 grievances/causes. When one of the RCs was returning home with the resolutions, the LRA arrested him and took him to their senior commander who told this person that the LRA had 14 more to add to list (i.e., 36 reasons).

Whatever was the cause then, the circumstances have changed so much from 10 years ago, that new reasons based on new developments, are continually being formulated to justify continued armed conflict.

1.3 Attempts to End the War

Various attempts have so far been made to end the conflict through military might and Acoli peace initiatives, but all these efforts have not yielded any positive outcomes. Voices of peace and reason have cried out for peace talks. From politicians to religious leaders, from children to elders, from the strong to the weak, from both the women and the men, etc., but all these cries have fallen on deaf hears. The NRM Government is stuck to its guns, it has categorically stated that it will not negotiate with „criminal" LRA, but will instead keep on killing them until they are finished. On the other hand, the LRA are reluctant to talk peace.

There have been a number of attempted negotiated settlements to the conflict in Northern Uganda, they include, the Nairobi Peace Jokes of 1985-86, Ababa Understanding of 1990, the aborted Awach Peace talks of 1994, and various our bilateral negotiations. But all these talks have failed to bring about the much needed results. Where then is the problem?

2.0 The Problem: Obstacles to Peace

The paper has focused on six major obstacles to peace. They are: Past experiences, poor communication, autopoeitic nature of the conflict, unclear northern Uganda policy, legitimised violence, and lack of a legitimate viable Acoli entity to spear head Acoli cause.

2.1 Past Experiences

One school of thought that is sceptical about a negotiated peace contends that, experience has shown that NRM is not trusted and doesn’t honour its commitments to an agreement. Supporters of this view point out to the various failed peace talks, for example the Nairobi Peace Talks (Jokes) of 1985-86, the Pece Accord of 1988, the Addis Ababa Understanding of 1990, and the failed Awach Peace Talks of 1994.

On the other hand, opponents of this view contend that there was/is no need to negotiate with "criminals", who have no political programmes. All they are prepared to do is to clean the country of all bad leaders and criminals.

But the question one should ask is: Who defines a criminal? Does holding political power absolve one from being a criminal? Are there any lessons that Ugandans could have learnt from NRA/M’s bush 1981 – 1986 war?

When seeking peace, the concept of political "criminality" should be understood as something relative and always subjectively defined. Furthermore, absence of a written political programme should not deter the search for a negotiated settlement. Whether we have the rosiest manifestos or political programmes and yet we don’t implement them to the satisfaction of the people, they are useless. After all, a political programme can be written in a couple of hours only.

2.2 Poor Communication

A central problem of a negotiated peace is the tone, methods, timing and the content of what the main actors say about each other. The kind of language and communication method used affects the possibility of a negotiated agreement. What we have been seeing in the last 12 years is the use of abusive, arrogant language by both parties to the conflict, through official statements, press conferences, radios, etc.. For example the NRM/UPDF call their opponents criminals, murders, dictators, Fascists, swine, etc.. Even after signing peace agreements with groups or individuals, the abusive language have still continued.

On the other hand, LRA/M calls the NRM dictators, murders, expansionists, corrupted, etc. This only serves to undermine interaction and confidence in the process of peace making. It is important to note that co-ordination of action and mutual understanding must be accomplished in practical action in concrete situations, eitherwise, no progress can be made.

2.3 Autopoeitic Nature of the Conflict

Autopoeisis is a systems ability for self regulation and control. Systems are goal oriented entities. They are governed by their purposes. Parts of a system must behave in accordance with its rules and must adopt to the environment on the basis of a feed back. This is done in order to avoid extinction. In this way, it maintains itself and stays in balance and it is less dependent on the environment.

Examining the conflict in Acoli very closely, we see that after 10 years the conflict has also gained an autopoeitic character. Acoli are killing themselves. 75% of the UPDF are Acoli, 99% of the LRA are Acoli. The LRA are killing Acoli civilians. Following this principle therefore, it would mean that the problem can’t end, because of self regulation and it is less dependent on the rest of Uganda. In so far as there are still able bodied people in Acoli from whom the rebels and government can recruit or conscribe, then the conflict will not end.

In this situation, the interest to negotiate peace doesn’t lie with the government, because of its ethnic composition. The structural outlook of LRA doesn’t even provide a possibility. The only possible solution to this problem is intense external pressure to off-set the equilibrium. This can best be done by neutral peace organisations like KM, UN, OAU and other humanitarian NGOs and good will governments.

2.4 Unclear Northern Uganda Policy

Since capturing power in 1986, the NRM has not had any clear consistent policy to deal with the conflict in Northern Uganda, not withstanding the fact that there is a whole Ministry of State in the Office of the Prime Minister concerned with the „pacification" process. Examing the budget funding of this ministry tells the whole story. It is grossly under funded. This could be interpreted as lack of interest and will to tackle the problem.

A bird’s eye view of NRM/UPDF’s balance sheet in Acoli and Northern Uganda as a whole, shows that it is greatly lacking. Some people will argue that they greatly improved in the last elections. But this is also questionable. The chances that the people voted out of disillusion is higher than that of genuine support. The people gave a „survival vote", but deep in their hearts it is different. Politically and security wise, the NRM/UPDF have not delivered much in this region.

The lack of a clear Northern policy has also undermined the NRM cadres and Acoli „high table men and women’s" efforts to deliver. Acolis have not seen much of the spill over effects of their sitting at the NRM high table. As the saying goes, „Man doesn’t live on words of the master alone, but also from the bread that he delivers!" Acoli say, „Gwok woto kama gi bolo ite iye cogo". The political creed says that, „popularity and support comes from the stomach and not from rosy political blue prints and words"! Not withstanding the general performance, there are also notable exceptions, particularly Mrs. Betty Bigombe and the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP). It is an indisputable fact that most of those who have benefited from her tenure of office have a positive attitude towards the NRM government.

Failure to deliver on the numerous promises made undermines any support for government’s military approach to the conflict and instead it has the effect of hardening the peoples’ attitude towards government.

Further evidence of unclear northern policy is found in the kind of conflicting statements issued by the different high ranking government officials. For example: President Museveni says, he will never talk to the rebels (criminals), but will instead deal with them militarily and defeat them (Bicachi, 1998;Busharizi, 1998; Wasswa, 1998); the Minister of State for the North, Hon. Owiny Dollo, denies that government doesn’t want to pursue peaceful means, he says, „ we all want peaceful means to end this conflict" (Muto-Ono p’Lajur, 1998a); the 4th Division Commander Gulu, Brig. Katumba Wamala is calling for peace talks (Muto-Ono p’Lajur, 1998b). In this situation, who is right and who is wrong. To whom should the desperate Acoli listen?

On the other hand in an undertone, President Museveni says, that while he is pursuing his militaristic approach, individuals and groups of individuals can go ahead and negotiate with Kony and LRA. In this kind of situation, even if Acolis negotiated peace with Kony and LRA, it is unlikely that NRM will accept the outcome. The sum effect of all these contradictions is that the majority of Acoli have most likely lost confidence in the NRM’s ability to guarantee peace in the region. What the people in Acoli most urgently need right now is peace and they are not yet worried about guaranteeing it.

Critics of this unclear policy point out that, this is all an NRM ploy to punish the people of the north for the alleged atrocities committed in Luwero, destroy the myth of the martial tribe by military means. And besides this, the NRM needs a war in order to sustain its support in the south.

2.5 Legitimised Violence

The culture of violence has been legitimised in Uganda. By endorsing the Akida Report, the Uganda Parliament dejure legitimised violence in Uganda and left it to the president and state institutions to implement it. The Akida Report can be summarised in one sentence as: „It is a violent, revenge loaded document." The supporters of this report have contended that, if government negotiates with „criminals", then they would be setting a dangerous precedent.

If the undertone of the Report was to deal a final death blow to the Acoli, then the Parliamentary Committee made a similar mistake like the 12 Council of Ministers of the European Community (European Union) on Bosnia (Balkans), or the Versailles Treaty of 1918, or the Algerian Governments refusal to honour the Islamic Fundamentalists (FIS) election victory.

The conduct of the Uganda Parliament raises a number of questions, namely: „Should all Acoli suffer because of the „sin„ of UNLAs in Luwero Triangle and Arua-Moyo? Are the Acoli not entitled to the exercise of justice? Are the so-called co-ethnic groups of the authors of these heinous crimes not entitled to acquittal from any collective quilt by pointing the finger in the right direction?"

The Akida Report kind of argument is putting the cart before the horse. What Acoli need first is peace, then justice can follow later. Furthermore, the focus of peace makers should not be on who has or has not the moral authority to designate who is a criminal and who is not. Our primary interest for now should not be to apportion blames for atrocities, but stopping the atrocities immediately and in the cheapest way possible.

2.6 Lack of a Viable Acoli Entity

The failure to evolve a viable neutral Acoli organisation to spearhead the fight for peace is a major obstacle to restoring peace in the area. Several factors that work to undermine the existence of a viable Acoli organisation can be identified, namely, cultural individualism (Arwot ki oda), elitist arrogance, jealousy and despise; the many years of turbulence; the wide gap between the elite and the populace. These factors have undermined any effort to forge a consensually acceptable leadership that is capable of uniting Acoli of all creeds, class, religious orientation and political inclinations.

For a long time, there was a lot of indifference about the war in Acoli. Most Acoli out rightly rejected the NRM, or adopted a cautious attitude - „just in case", and because of this, many things continued to go wrong until a whole generation has been swallowed up in death, misery and pain. This situation raises many questions. For example: Is there anything like Acoliness? Are there some common values that Acoli can share together? Has the many years of suffering under different leadership in Uganda raised any Acoli consciousness? Do the Acoli prefer to suffer individually than collectively? Is Acoli individualism too strong to even bring them together in situations of life and death?

Recent, the evil that has been going on in Acoli appears to have touched the heart of each and everybody. This new developments makes the struggle for peace inevitable. The majority have now called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

3.0 Positive Signs for Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict

Recent developments in Uganda, the region and the world are auguring well for a possible peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Uganda. These signs include: the rejection of continued war by the majority of Acoli and the awaking of Acoli consciousness; the rise of many new peace organisations and initiatives, such as the Human Rights Focus, based in Gulu, Kacoke Madit (KM), Bedo Piny (BP), etc.; the escalation of the war in Western Uganda; the sudden outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia; the exchange of prisoners of war between the Sudan and Uganda, the international publicity of the heinous events taking place in Northern Uganda; and the dismal performance of UPDF.

3.1 Who is/are responsible for restoring Peace?

All of us - individuals, groups of individuals, organisations, the Church, NGOs, regional and international organisations - should work collectively to press for an early peaceful resolution of the conflict. Above all, we should recognise the fact that the key to peace lies with us the Acoli who are suffering and not anybody else.

The starting premise of any peaceful resolution of any conflict should be to accept that conflict is not an uncompromising fight between two individual or collective actors, each committed to a specific goal and each trying to realise this goal against the resistance of the opposing party without any willingness to give up even a part of his or her intent. When we amalgamate conflict theory with economic thought, we arrive at the fact that conflict is an ongoing process of bargaining.

What is urgently needed is a recognised neutral legitimate entity to act as a pressure group to bring the warring parties to a negotiating table. Its other responsibilities shall be to co-ordinate the efforts of the other different groups with the same objectives.

3.2 What should be done to restore and sustain the peace?

In order to build confidence and understanding between NRM/UPDF and LRA/M, KM, the OAU, the UN, IGGAD, other organisations and individuals and groups of individuals concerned with conflict resolution in northern Uganda, should help the to two parties come to a talking understanding each other, so that they can co-ordinate their actions to rationally pursue goals, and attain the gratification of not their needs alone but their needs encupsuled in the people’s needs.

While the above mentioned entities are doing this, the two warring parties should enter into a cease fire and operate with restraint and avoid using abusive and demeaning language at each other or other people.

3.3 Suggested Solutions

The proposals for the removal of some of the obstacles to peace are categorised as follows: Individual action, community action and institutional action.

3.3.1 Individual level

3.3.1.1 Self examination and reflection

Starting from all of us gathered here, down to the grassroots from where we have come, we should carry out self examination and reflection on our role in the conflict. Each and every one of us should ask: What have I done or not done, to aid and abet the conflict? Do I have any feelings for others to live in this world a comfortable life? Or if I am not living a comfortable life, should the others also suffer because of my personal interests? Is war the only way of fulfilling my egoistic interests or are there other non-violent ways

3.3.1.2 Lakwal Kong Ocam Obol (Equal access to the National Cake)

If the current Acoli apathy or resentment of the NRM government is due to the fact that people don’t understand the Movement and have not seen its benefits, then Government and particularly Acolis who are reaping from the NRM/UPDF "high table" should do something to enable the Acoli people enjoy their full shares of the national cake first as citizens and secondly as tax payers.

The national development policy of "tying rural development to votes" is crude irrational and unacceptable in any democratic society. Acolis are among the leading tax payers of Uganda, despite the current debilitating war. It is therefore, wrong to deny them, even by word of mouth (psychological torture), the right to live in peace and attain development.

3.3.2 At the Acoli Community level

3.3.2.1 Supporting KM and Other Peace Initiatives

I concur with all those who say that the key to restoration of peace lies with the Acoli and not NRM or LRA, because these two are part of the wider problem that should be solved. They have for the last 12 years decided on the course to follow. Peace on their own terms. Their own terms spells death to a lot of innocent people. It is up to those (Acoli and their neighbours) caught in between the conflict to look up to their own interests. The key to peace cannot lie with the combatants, but with those who are victims of their war. This means that we can’t rely on them much for peace

KM is spearheading the search for peace and development in Acoli. They and all other local and international organisations and associations struggling to restore peace and sanity into our mother land deserve all our unqualified support and commendation for the good work so far done. These organisations and institutions are effective means of intervention into the autopoetic nature of the conflict.

If KM is to make any further positive strides, then it has to reorganise its structure and operations to meet the challenges of the day. Eitherwise, they will remain a conference organising institution. Our most immediate challenge is to assist them improve on their effectiveness and efficiency. In so doing, we should also avoid any form of parochialism which forments division in our midst. It is a greater realistic challenge to assistant in transforming an institutions than to simply oppose it because of some of its aspects.

3.3.2.2 Diversification of Peace Making

For a long time the challenge of restoring peace in Acoli was left to the government, but this has not been successful. The single-shot „table at the top", the high table for leaders approach to peace making should be avoided. Individuals and various groups should be allowed to generate a flow of peace ideas. Proposals may be contradictory, but peace also varies from place to place. All attempts should be made to tap these diversities and marginalising nobody. This is because making peace itself is a model of structural peace.

But above all, all these efforts should be co-ordinated at a centre and constant report submission and comparison of notes and progresses should be made to the centre for onward transmission to other member organisations and individuals. This kind of co-ordination shall eliminate duplications and help build unity and coherence of ideas in a multi-prong approach to the problem of war in Acoli.

3.3.3 Institutional Responsibility

3.3.3.1 Creating human rights culture

The NRM government has issued statements expressing willingness to talk to the LRA rebels on condition that they improve on their human rights records. In conflict management and resolution, the very first expressed intention of a peaceful resolution of the conflict is a positive step in the right direction, and peace makers shouldn’t lose sight of this. This should be commended. The onus has now been thrown to LRA to show positive concrete signs that they are changing or they have now changed from their previous unanimously condemned practice of blatant violation of human and particularly the children’s rights.

 LRA should pursue this challenge further and throw another challenge to the Government, and in so doing, they open up the first step of familiarising with each other and thereafter they create a culture of bargaining, which is essentially the first basic step to peaceful resolution of conflicts.

3.3.3.2 Peace Education

The evolution of peace is a slow process of social learning. Since for a long time the people in Acoli have been living under conditions which bred in them hate and the love to fight, there is need to establish special programmes to teach the people and particularly the children peaceful human relations. Such programmes help to initiate provide and enhance knowledge and develops positive attitudes and beliefs. If such a programme was introduced by the government some ten years back, by now they would be about to repeat a new generation of youths who detest war and love peace, but no such programmes were instituted. Consequently, we now have a generation of children who have known nothing except misery and terror.

3.3.3.3 Undoing the Collective sub-conscious

Undoing cultural violence is even more difficult, this is because structural violence is hidden in the sub-conscious. When dealing with peace, attempts should be made to disintegrate the sub-conscious in the following ways: national interests, Acoli interests, individual interests; the individual sub-conscious and the collective sub-conscious.

If the NRM and LRA top dogs still insist on war, they should know that there are other forms of equally challenging national issue fights, which can produce the same results as war but which avoid the horrors of war. For example fighting natural forces. I propose that they should draft all the young men of Uganda to go out and fight against the natural forces that man must overcome in order to increase his standard of living and his general happiness. The majority of Ugandans are walloping in a sea of poverty and misery and the environment is in a sorrow state. There is the insurmountable problem of the water hyacinth. There are deforested areas that need reforestation, floods to be controlled, ravaging diseases, like AIDS and Malaria, to be checked, and roads, bridges and buildings to be constructed for the public convenience and good. The Government should draft all young men and women, including all LRAs of a certain age to spend a year or more in such labour, other than engaging in killing each other. This would easily give them the prestige and glory which would be a moral equivalent of war.

3.3.3.4 Revisiting the Akida Report and Legitimising Peace Action

The Akida Report should be revisited and stripped off all violence lauded clauses. Instead, peace action should be legitimised if it is to lead to peace. If it is not legitimised, then anybody or even the military who are ready to spread death around might say, „peace is our profession". „Because there is a demand and we deliver the supply", because we supply and create the demand". Placing the responsibility with the demand side is not good. If the demand comes from the state system, governmental or intergovernmental, this will be seen by some as solving the problem of legitimacy, particularly, if the governments are democratic.

The task of creative, positive conflict transformation is not only to avoid violence, to abstain from the irreversible, but to increase the entropy by coming out of the phase of the conflict with more mature selves and more mature social transformations around. When acting to attain peace, it is always important to remember that conflict transformation can also be negative, leaving enormous irreversibility in all spheres including the soul. In the case of the soul: it can generate hatred, craving for revenge, restitution, building one’s future life around intense wishes to exchange one irreversibility for the other. In this situation therefore, a spirit of forgiveness (not forgetting) on top of complex and creative conflict transformation could be helpful. There are some living examples of such practices from Gandhi, Nelson Mandela.

3.3.3.5 Government Should Formulate Pro-people Northern Policy

Acoli at the NRM high table should convince their colleagues that Northern Uganda needs a coherent, consistent and pro-people policy, to enable immediate peaceful resolution of the conflict. The cost of war is too high to continue this way. Government should now for once open its hears and listen to the wish of the people in need, other than always trying to justify its failures. Irresponsible statements are very easy to utter, but in the final analyse, they are very costly.

4.0 Summary and Conclusion

In part one, the paper discussed an overview of the current problem of continued armed confrontation between Uganda government troops and the LRA rebels, with the view of highlighting its devastating impact and building a consensus on a negotiated settlement rather than continued military confrontation.

In part two the paper outlined six major obstacles to peace. They include, past experiences of failed peace negotiations; poor communication. First and fore most between the warring parties, and then secondly, between the warring parties and their victims – the civilians; autopoetic nature of the conflict; lack of a clear policy on ending the conflict in the north; legitimisation of violence by Uganda’s Parliament; and lack of a viable Acoli entity to unite all the Acoli, and secondly articulate Acoli demands and concerns to the establishment.

In part three, suggestions are made for removing obstacles. In making the suggestions, recognition was made of the fact that the Acoli have all to gain in leading the struggle for peace. The suggestions were, self examination and reflection by all those who are directly or indirectly involved in the conflict; an end to the politics of "votes for development" and blanketing blame; supporting KM other peace organisation/institution initiatives; creating human rights culture; embarking on peace education, undoing all the collective sub-conscious; revisiting the Akida Report; and lastly, formulating a pro-people policy for northern Uganda.

In conclusion, it is important to note that there are now positive signs for possible peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Uganda, and consequently, no opportunity should be lost in taking advantage of the present circumstance to press for an immediate negotiated peace in the north and the rest of Uganda. Institutions like KM and the Church to take the lead using a multi-prong approach to bring the warring parties to the table and save the lives of those innocent brothers and sisters caught in this conflict.

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