Acoli, Victims of the Northern War and Isolation

Dr. Ben Ochora. Latigo
KM International Co-ordinator
Sylvania, Ohio, USA

Contents
- Persecution of the Acholi
- Beginning and Growth of Rebel Activities
- War or Peace
- Conclusions and Recommendations

Abstract

Since the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) assumed power in Uganda in January 1986, much of Acholiland, comprising the Districts of Gulu and Kitgum in northern Uganda, has experienced a tremendous deprivation due to an insecurity perpetrated by rebels and elements of Uganda’s security forces. The situation in most of Uganda is quite different however, and citizens in these parts of the country enjoy peace, economic development, and excellent educational and social services. In 11 years of being in power, the government of President Museveni appears to have no will to solve the insecurity problem. On the other hand, Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels based in the Sudan, have exacted untold death and devastation to the Acholi. In spite of a call by the Acholi community for a peaceful end to the insurrection, the pogrom continues. The Uganda Government appears to have adopted a win-at-all-cost military strategy. On the other hand, the LRA appears to have no perceived political strategy except a military strategy designed to exact the most suffering to any Acholi community that appears to succumb or comply with any government initiatives. Acholiland today appears to be caught up in an international quagmire in connection with the regional conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, the Sudan, and Zaire. It is an open secret that the Uganda Government is involved directly or indirectly in channelling assistance to the conflicts in all of these regions. One cannot help but wonder if Acholiland is the sacrificial lamb. This paper reviews the dilemma of the citizens in Acholiland and proposes ways that the Acholi community in the Diaspora can explore to bring an end to the conflict.

Introduction

The Acholi (Acoli) represents a cultural and geographical identity that evolved in northern Uganda over centuries from diverse ethnic groups [1]. When Arab ivory and slave traders first made contacts in the region between 1850-1860, versions of the word “Acholi” evolved to describe the people and culture [2]. There was no Acholi nation per se before then as the people identified themselves with their own Kaka or clan, headed by a Rwot, Chief [1]. There was also no central authority equivalent to a King or Paramount Chief. Some of the major Kaka in the area are Alero, Atiak, Bwobo, Chua, Koich, Koro, Labongo, Lamogi, Pabo, Padibe, Palaro, Palabek, Paluo, Patiko, and Payira. The Payira, located in the central region and with close kinship with the Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom, was recognised as the largest and most influential Kaka in the pre-colonial era. With the evolution of the region, and the dominance of the Luo culture promoted by the southward migrating Luo, the Luo culture and language took hold in the region and became adopted by other ethnic groups such as the Jie, Lango, and Madi within the Luo sphere of influence. By 1900, the people and culture in the region was clearly identifiable as “Acholi”: the word itself having Arabic origins associating the people with the Shilluk of Central Sudan, also a Luo speaking people.

For most of the people of southern Uganda, Acholi is used erroneously to identify most Nilotic, Sudanic, and Hamitic peoples of northern Uganda. These include the Alur, Jonam, Jopadhola, Itesot, Jie, Kakwa, Karamojong, Kumam, Labwor, Langi, Lugbara, Madi, etc. Considering that the pre-1986 Uganda Armed Forces were dominated by nationals from these ethnic groups, President Museveni and some in his government have created a stigma in the use of the Acholi identity to gain political advantage from citizens from other parts of Uganda. As a consequence, the “real” Acholi have suffered untold discrimination and inhuman treatment in all sectors of Uganda life since 1986. These include civil service, education, armed forces, banking and private sector, public service, and political appointments. At Independence in 1962, the Acholi enjoyed among the highest per capita representation in Uganda’s Higher Education. This was primarily the result of investment by the many Acholi soldiers who served at home in Uganda and abroad in the Colonial Administration. Today, most of the educational institutions in Acholi is dysfunctional, and school-age children lag behind the nation in all educational sections. Many have been forcibly recruited or abducted by the rebel forces and face an uncertain future. Considering the overtures of the Government of President Museveni and the posture of the LRA rebels, there is little hope that either can yield to the wishes of the people of Acholi to seek a quick and peaceful resolution to the conflict. Northern Uganda, and Acholiland in particular, is quite isolated from events taking place in the central regions of Uganda where the seat of government is. As a consequence, the Government of Uganda has successfully waged an international campaign to lessen the impact of the insurrection. To potential investors, the insecurity in the North is used to divert investments elsewhere. At the same time, the government has waged an international campaign to discredit the rebels in order to enable the government acquire military wares that appear to be overwhelming in winning the war against a supposedly discredited rebel force. Press coverage of the war has, at times, been restricted or censored. There is much anecdotal evidence that some of the military wares have been used to support the activities of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of John Garang in the Sudan as well as to combat the LRA [3]. In the Sudan itself, the Government of General Bashir appears to be secretly supporting the LRA operational bases in the south which are used as bases for training and the mounting of attacks in Acholiland. Although the common people of Acholi do not generally support the rebels, they have no choice. With the government unable to provide adequate protection, the people are victims of both the war and isolation. Persecution of the Acholi. Following the NRA success in toppling the coalition regime of Tito Okello in 1986, the NRA immediately disarmed the various military factions in and around Kampala, the capital. These included the UFM and FEDEMU. The latter had a particularly bad reputation for harbouring Kampala thugs and criminals. The UNLA, the Uganda Army at the time, fled largely with its military wares to the North and East of the country. A large portion of the soldiers and wares ending up in Acholiland. With the NRA success in Kampala, a great deal of suffering and death was exacted on captured UNLA soldiers as well as civilians referred to by the populace as “Anyanya” . Many people identified thus, or as “Acholi”, were burnt to death inside truck tires or subjected to the “Kandoya” treatment in which the arms and feet were tied together exposing the chest and the victims rolled around like balls. In this vulnerable position, victims faced imminent death. Among the civilian population in and around Kampala, many identified as “Acholi” or “Anyanya” soon began to experience an unprecedented level of persecution and discrimination. These included being forcibly evicted from government houses, loss of jobs, and an unprecedented wave of NRA arrests of civilians. The Press, too, was biased and spared no time in “convicting” the disadvantaged. Many arrested by the NRA appeared in the Courts with fabricated capital charges designed simply to keep the victims in jail while their jobs or business were taken away. As the NRA forged upcountry to “liberate” the rest of the country, assisted by some integrated elements of the UFM and FEDEMU forces, news of the victimisation perpetrated in Kampala travelled swiftly and reached some of the retreating UNLA soldiers. However, with some help from local leaders, the NRA was able to enter towns such as Gulu and Kitgum without firing a shot. In many respects, the civilian population in Acholi accepted the NRA soldiers and embraced the security they initially provided. Beginning and Growth of Rebel Activities. The honeymoon the Acholi enjoyed with the NRA did not last long. When elements of FEDEMU based in Tororo were deployed to the North in 1986, the NRA quickly lost control of the situation as the more disciplined men and officers retreated to the comfort and luxury of Kampala to seek wealth. Some ex-UNLA Acholi soldiers who surrendered to the NRA were removed to remote detention camps in Western Uganda and subjected to torture and political training. The courtesy that appeared to be extended to UFM and FEDEMU soldiers were not extended to the UNLA. As the news of the whereabouts of the soldiers and their treatment reached Acholiland, discontent began to brew among the ex-UNLA who had assimilated into the local population. The situation was ripe for a rebel movement but there was no clear political or military leadership. Otema Allimadi, the leader of the Uganda People’s Democratic Movement (UPDM) based in London, and commanders of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) based in refugee camps in the Sudan, did not appear to be co-ordinated; nor did they enjoy grassroots support among the Acholi people. With the attack of the NRA forces in Acholi growing, many clan leaders appealed to the UPDA and other rebel forces not to start a war at home. In Acholi, “Mony pe ki oto paco,” you don’t start a war at home, so the saying goes. But, without a clear political or military objective, in September of 1986, the UPDA soldiers re-entered Uganda through Bibia, apparently after being re-armed by the Sudan [4]. However, that insurrection came to a peaceful end late the same year and the UPDM was left without a fighting force and an ineffective political organisation. With the Acholi people seemingly alienated and isolated by the NRM Government, the growing rebel movement, though lacking local support, provided some element of respect that was absent from the national scene. As news of atrocities committed by the NRA in different parts of Acholi grew, so did the impetus for the rebel movement. References by the NRM stalwart to the Acholi as “biological substances”, “murderers”, “killers”, and such other derogatory phrases was not helpful to the situation. They were indicators that NRM/A did not value the life of the Acholi and wanted the “Northerners” stereotyped for political gains. In this vacuum stepped the flamboyant and magical Priestess Alice Lichen and her Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) [4]. Alice Lichen was successful in her own way in recruiting a wide spectrum of followers to join her movement. Her soldiers were quite brave and successfully mounted attacks against NRA posts in the North during the period 1986-1987. Eventually, in 1987, Alice Lichen’s forces crossed Lake Kyoga and attacked NRA outposts in Busoga. In this attack, the Holy Spirit Movement had overextended itself and suffered severe losses from which it would never recover. Many of the movement’s followers were either killed in the attack or captured: the most famous prisoner being Professor Isaac Ojok, Minister of Education during 1980-1985. Alice Lakwena herself fled into exile and has been living in refugee camps in Kenya ever since. By the end of 1988, several rebel commanders of the UPDA and the HSM entered into peace agreements with the NRM Government and its soldiers absorbed in the Uganda Army. Following the defeat of the HSM, a period of lull in rebel activity in Acholiland followed. In spite of the resolve of the Acholi to accept the NRM Government and concentrate on economic development, the government did not reciprocate the goodwill. While the rest of the country was experiencing tremendous developments in infrastructure, educational institutions, and economic development, not a single major project was started and implemented in northern Uganda. The isolation and victimisation continued unabated. The one Acholi Minister of State in the Government, Betty Bigombe, had the portfolio of “Pacification of the North,” itself a derogatory connotation implying conquest and subjugation. Alice Lakwena was succeeded by Joseph Kony, a cousin brother, but also with no formal military training except as a 1986 UPDA recruit. Kony’s perceived mission, apparently blessed by some Acholi elders in a ritual at Got Ato Hills in 1988 [4], was to save the Acholi from the ravages of the NRA and the persecution of the Acholi people by the NRM Government. The Joseph Kony rebel movement soon acquired the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) name perhaps as the English equivalent of “ Lukwena Pa Lubanga,” which in Acholi means the Lord’s Messengers. Kony took up the remnants of the rag-tag army, and giving it a fundamentalist outlook, went on spreading terror until 1991 when a tough military operation flushed out the last pockets of resistance [5]. After two years of almost complete peace in northern Uganda, the rebels made a violent comeback towards the end of 1993. This time they came well trained and armed by the Sudanese army. In 1993, Betty Bigombe, Minister of State Resident in Gulu, initiated contacts with the LRA. Her attempts at peace talks held in the bush in January 1994 failed because President Museveni publicly announced contradictory statements that immediately jeopardised Betty Bigombe’s peace initiatives. Ever since, the LRA have continued spreading sporadic havoc, mostly against civilians. As Ugandans prepared for the mid-1996 Presidential and Parliamentary elections, the LRA mounted the heaviest offensive yet. Allegations by the government that the LRA were a group of bandits were soon dispelled. The LRA entered Gulu District in early February, murdering villagers, burning down houses and abducting young men and women [6]. With the Presidential elections at stake, the war gained some national and even international prominence, even if only short-lived. President Museveni privately sought help from the United States and other countries to quell the LRA attacks on the basis that the LRA was backed by the Sudan; a country condemned for its support of terrorism and support of Islamic Fundamentalism. In Uganda, President Museveni’s support of John Garang’s SPLA was an open secret. The insecurity in Acholiland, initially alleged to be caused by a group of bandits, suddenly assumed international proportions. The military wares changed too. Landmines and RPGs became the weapons of choice by the LRA. The Uganda Army, renamed the UPDF, resorted to use of helicopter gunships, tanks, anti-aircraft weaponry, and sophisticated night-vision equipment apparently supplied by the United States. The use of satellite intelligence to locate rebel positions was also alleged. President Museveni himself relocated his operations to Gulu in order to command the war and appointed General Salim Saleh, his step-brother, as his special political and military advisor on affairs of the North with a brief to end the war. Several retired Acholi army officers were also recalled to fight the insurgency.. Earlier, in 1995, reports surfaced that the NRA was using the South African mercenary organisation, Executive Outcomes, to fight the LRA [3]. The LRA insurgency was, until now, primarily confined to Gulu District, from where most of the LRA recruits were obtained. Kitgum District had been spared and some development activities proceeding well much like in the neighbouring Lango Districts of Lira and Apach. However, in mid-January 1997, a group of LRA rebels launched a series of attacks on Kitgum’s civilian population, leaving over 300 people dead and 60,000 people displaced from their homes [6]. The attacks took place in the north of the district, close to Uganda’s border with Sudan, primarily in and around the villages of Lokung, Palabek and Padibe. In these attacks, which marked the end of relative security in Kitgum District, the rebels attacked village residents with axes and clubs and set ablaze their houses and granaries. The LRA attacks in Kitgum continued into February. The large-scale displacement they caused, took the district completely by surprise and the level and scale of suffering have even surpassed those previously experienced in Gulu District. According to the accounts of former abductees reported in the Uganda press, the LRA is avenging the population of Kitgum for its alleged co-operation with the Uganda Army, the UPDF [6]. In the May 1996 Presidential elections, President Museveni fared very poorly in Acholi. For the Acholi, this was a message that the NRM policy had failed and that President Museveni had shown no will to end the rebellion. They were therefore willing to put their trust in someone else, Dr. Paul Ssemogerere, Museveni’s main challenger. Dr. Ssemogerere used the impending elections to call for a negotiated peace with the rebels. He was opportunistic and never condemned rebel atrocities or rejected their support. But, in him, unlike the incumbent President, the Acholi saw an opportunity for a return to peace in Acholiland. The Acholi as a community have made concerted efforts to end the rebellion. These include the aborted effort of Betty Bigombe in 1994. A detailed summary of these efforts is contained in a 1996 submission by the Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG) [7]. The Acholi in the Diaspora have also responded. The Acholi Community in North America held a three-day meeting in Toronto and a nine-point resolution was sent to President Museveni [8]. To date, there has been no official response to the Toronto resolutions. The Kacoke Madit, London, April 5-6, 1997 follows in the footsteps of Toronto 1996 and is a major and concerted effort by the Acholi in the Diaspora to bring an end to the war. In mid-1996, the Catholic Bishops of Uganda tried to initiate a dialogue to end the war. In June, three Bishops were given a mandate by the Uganda Episcopal Conference to travel to the North, study the situation and recommend ways to talk with Kony [4]. Initially, the attempts were thrown in doubt when three Acholi elders related to key LRA commanders were killed, allegedly by the rebels, as they initiated contacts between the rebels and the local UPDF commanders. Shortly afterward, the LRA attacked Sudanese refugees in Acol-Pii Agago refugee camp. This attack hardened the government position. These actions demonstrate how the local people have been held ransom by the circumstances. On the one side, the LRA are unpredictable and appear to have no inclination to buy goodwill among the people they supposedly want to “liberate”. On the other hand, the government continues to send mixed messages while playing hard-ball on the issue of peace initiatives. The irony in all this is that both sides appear to behave the same. Neither is listening to the people or their representatives. The APG’s Report echoed the sentiments of the people: The people of Acholi have lost confidence in government as an institution whose primary duty is to protect the lives and property of its citizens [7]. While the behaviour of the rebels is atrocious, the Acholi are desperate and are willing to forgive Joseph Kony and the LRA. President Museveni who holds the reigns of power, could easily and immediately bring a peaceful end to the rebellion through peaceful negotiations mediated by a neutral party. The close association of President Museveni with rebels John Garang of the SPLA [3], Laurent Kabila of Zaire [9], and the rebel governments of Rwanda and Burundi, raises legitimate questions about his ultimate motives in the protracted war in Acholiland. Under President Museveni’s Government, Uganda has been in the forefront internationally in efforts to resolve conflicts in Burundi, Liberia, and Somalia. And, close to home, the rebel movements in Rwanda and Eastern Zaire have openly enjoyed Uganda’s support. Since mid-1996, President Museveni himself has relocated to Gulu to command the war against the LRA. It is arguable whether or not Ugandan citizens, and the Acholi in particular, view this move as “Presidential”. With Uganda reportedly spending over one million US dollars per day to fight the LRA, one wonders whether this money could not be spent in reconstruction and development by seeking a peaceful solution. In a thought provoking article, Andrew Mwenda managed to capture the feelings of the Acholi community about the impasse: The Acholi say it’s because government is prejudiced against them as a tribe, it’s “anti-northern.” Therefore, it does not care about their suffering, or it is happy at their misfortune [10]. In the same article, Andrew Mwenda argues that if the rebellion had been in President Museveni’s home district, resulting in atrocities being committed on his relatives and the loss of livestock and other valuable property, the President’s response to such an act would certainly be different from that to the northern rebellion because the death of his neighbour, the burning of his father’s house, or the looting of his cows has a direct and personal bearing on him. The same applies to the majority of the (non-Acholi) commanders fighting in the North. Considering several unfortunate comments by those in the government, including President Museveni and his Prime Minister Kintu Musoke, one might be tempted to add to the above statements. That is, Joseph Kony and the LRA might be a blessing to the government in the sense that they are doing the dirty job for the government! This point was not missed by Ogen Kevin Aliro in his serious but satirical article [11]. The Acholi are victims of the war, isolation, and circumstance. Things are happening all around: in Rwanda, Burundi, the Sudan, and Zaire. And, in most parts of Uganda, there is peace and development. With the impasse between the NRM Government and the LRA, Ogen Kevin Aliro argues that for once the Acholi might have finally got a just cause to take up arms and fight a new war. A war for their very survival [11]. This might mean taking up arms against both the UPDF and the LRA in order to survive. Conclusions and Recommendations. The escalation of the insecurity in Northern Uganda, and Acholi in particular, is the result of the complex political dynamics taking place in the Great Lakes Regions and the Sudan. This has resulted in the establishment of Tutsi dominated governments in both Rwanda and Burundi. The present government in Rwanda was established by a rebel force based in Uganda with the majority of its senior officers, including Vice President Paul Kagame, a senior officer in the NRA/NRM Government. The Banyamulenge, a Tutsi ethnic group in Eastern Zaire, is behind the present rebellion in Eastern Zaire. Some of its officers are alleged to have been trained in Uganda and speak English with accents easily recognisable as Ugandan. There has been some speculation in East Africa that the Tutsi lead rebellion is a master plan, with Uganda at the center, to establish a Tutsi Nation. To some, this helps to explain President Museveni’s reluctance to end the LRA rebellion. The continuation of the war can depopulate vast segments of Acholiland and prepare it for a resettlement by ethnic groups in the South who are land-starved. This might sound far-fetched but is a topic of considerable discussion and distress among the Acholi community. Neither the LRA or the Uganda Government can end the rebellion on their own. However, the government holds the reigns and can pretty much dictate the direction of events. If the Acholi community should sound more critical of the Government that the LRA, this is the reason why. The Acholi community has no hope in the ability of the LRA in providing peace in the area. It is the government that they must look to. Therefore, as a first step, the Uganda Government must show a genuine and open desire for peace talks with the rebels. All over the world, there have been peace negotiations with rebel groups. In 1985, the coalition government of General Tito Okello entered into genuine peace talks with the NRM/A even though, at the time, the NRA had resurfaced and was rebuilding in the western and southern parts of Uganda. Recently, it was reported that President Museveni had offered an olive branch to Joseph Kony and his top commanders [12]. The offer was conveyed by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Aliker while speaking at a meeting with Acholi traditional leaders at function on March 24. The language of the alleged offer as reported in the Press is contradictory. Similar third-party offers have been made before but have either been denied or contradicted by the President. Dr. Aliker is on record once before about such a Presidential peace overture. However, while he was away from the country, he was contradicted by the President. This type of action, as noted before with the peace initiatives of Betty Bigombe, may cause the Acholi to loose respect for their representatives. Considering that the NRM’s record at the 1985 Nairobi Peace Talks reflects an insincerity in peace negotiations, such offers must be extended openly by the President himself after some homework has been done to involve respected third parties such as the ICRC, UN Agencies, Churches, respected leaders such as former President Jimmy Carter, or neutral Foreign Governments. It is recommended that this initiative be taken without undue delay. Cessation of hostilities must simultaneously follow a declaration of the peace initiative and a third neutral party such as the ICRC invited by both sides to monitor the ceasefire. There are probably at least 500,000 people within Acholi displaced by the war; many, especially in Gulu District live in so-called ‘protected villages’ that are no more than villages set up for the operational convenience of the UPDF. There is no good estimate of the number of Acholi living in other Ugandan townships and cities such as Kampala, Jinja, and Entebbe as displaced people. Since 1986, many Acholi had to seek refuge in foreign countries as political refugees or to escape persecution. The majority of these are in Canada, Kenya, the Sudan, Sweden, UK, USA, and other European countries. It is recommended that these should also be involved in any peace initiatives to cater for the interests of those in the Diaspora. President Museveni cannot unilaterally continue to ignore the wishes of the Acholi people or impose unrealistic pre-conditions for peace initiatives. The LRA on the other hand cannot expect to continue to survive when its primary mission is viewed by the Acholi as that of committing atrocities and maiming innocent citizens. Although the war has lasted 11 years, the time is right and ripe for a settlement. It is recommended that the LRA immediately establish a channel of communication with the Acholi and clearly communicate its wishes to the government and the citizens. It is not clear to the Acholi and the Ugandan citizens at this time what the LRA’s mission is. The paramount objective of the Kacoke Madit is to discuss and make recommendations on ways to end the 11-year war. It is recommended that the Kacoke Madit form an Implementation Committee to follow up on the recommendations. Both the LRA and the Uganda Government should be fully appraised of the recommendations. Should there be undue delay from both sides in responding to the recommendations, the Implementation Committee should embark on an international campaign to end the war. Finally, it is recognised that Northern Uganda has lagged behind in development because of policies initiated by the Colonial Administration. This anomaly has never been successfully addressed although concerted efforts were made in the period about 1962-1971. At this time, the imbalance in development between the North and the South has never been greater. Once peace is established in the North, this problem must be addressed immediately otherwise the potential for insecurity in Uganda will persist. This is succinctly stated in the following statements in the March 1997 United Nations Humanitarian Situation Report on Uganda: This situation has fuelled resentment and grievances in the north and created a context in which northerners have a lower stake in Uganda’s development than their southern counterparts. Unless and until this situation is addressed, something which in turn depends upon improved security in the north, Uganda will find it difficult to achieve lasting stability and economic development [6]. The Ugandan Constitution guarantees everyone equal rights. Therefore, everyone should have an equal stake in the development of the country. Unfortunately, the situation and circumstance in northern Uganda makes this impossible at this time. I believe that it is our collective responsibility to bring the war to a quick and peaceful end. Bibliography 1. Ronald R. Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of Uganda before 1800, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1994. 2. F.K. Girling, The Acholi of Uganda, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London 1960. 3. Al J. Venter/Soldiers of Fortune, BLOODY TRIANGLE: Uganda, Sudan and Zaire, October 1996. 4. Sam Gonza/NPFs, Uganda: Rebel Killings Raise More Questions, New People Feature Service, Issue 53, August, 1996. 5. Charles Ojok/AFRICANEWS, “Rebels Still a Reality”. AFRICANEWS - Koinonia Media Centre, P.O. Box 8034, Nairobi, Kenya, May 1996. 6. United Nations, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Situation Report on Uganda, 15 March 1997. 7. Acholi Parliamentary Group, Report to the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs Investigating the Northern Rebellion with a View to Bringing it to a Speedy End. Tolit Olwor-Atiya/The New Vision, October 28, 996. 8. Ben O. Latigo/Acholi Community North America, Toronto Resolutions on Conflict in Northern Uganda, Press Release, September 11, 1996. 9. Stephen Buckley/Washington Post, “Uganda is said to be aiding rebel forces in eastern Zaire”, The Seattle Times, Tuesday, March 4, 1997. 10. Andrew M. Mwenda/The Monitor, “Can the non-Acholi President Museveni end the Kony War?”, September 20, 199611] 11. Ogen Kevin Aliro/The Monitor, LETTER TO MY DEAR MOTHER: May be, Acholi Have Just Cause to Fight, September 20, 1996. 12. The Monitor, Museveni offers Kony Olive branch, March 26,1997.