SPEECH BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR NORTHERN UGANDA REHABILITATION, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, HON. OMWONY-OJWOK

AT THE KACOKE MADIT 2000 (KM2000)
NAIROBI NOVEMBER 2000

1. Introduction

Only five minutes before the start of today’s opening session, I was asked to provide a curtain raiser to my keynote address of tomorrow. As a person originating from Karamoja, I am already used to ambushes! So I took the challenge.

I wish to warmly express my sincere thanks and commendation to all those responsible for organising this gathering, particularly the Kacoke Madit (KM) organisation, which is the engine of this initiative. We thank the external support institutions, notably the government and people of the United Kingdom, whose support was granted by the Department for International Development (DFID) through Conciliation Resources.

I thank the government of Kenya for permitting us to meet in this country, in the true spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood within the East African cooperation.

I was asked last year, when I had just been appointed Minister of State in charge of Northern Uganda, what the Ugandan government’s position would be on continued support to KM by the British government and other institutions of good will. I had no hesitation in advocating for a continuation and even expansion of this support.

This is because the Acholi community in the Diaspora needs to be encouraged and facilitated to continue to make their just contribution to the complex challenges faced by that section of the Ugandan society.

Since I left London to return permanently to Uganda in 1994 I have, during my many visits, especially to Britain, USA, Canada and the Scandinavian countries, noted with gratification the increasing maturity of the Ugandan communities abroad. The Acholi community is witnessing increasing commitment to peace, to mutual collaboration among themselves and with government, as well as with other partners. I thank you, our people in the Diaspora, for your efforts and urge you to continue on this constructive path.

To the government of Uganda, this constitutes an important gathering. I am sure the Acholi in Uganda are also pinning significant hope in the outcome of these deliberations. We all need to put this in mind.

I suggest that this Kacoke Madit be turned into a ‘Wang o’ (evening fire-place): where we shall feed ourselves and each other in terms of ideas towards intellectual, social, cultural, economic, spiritual and moral betterment.

Kindly allow me to introduce the Ugandan government delegation here. From the central government, we have the following:

• Hon. Betty Akech Okullu, Minister of State for Education and Sports (Higher Education);
• Hon. Omony Ogaba, Minister of State for Education and Sports (Sports);
• Mr. G. W. Odwong, Presidential Adviser;
• Hon. Abednego Ongom, MP and Chairperson of the Acholi Parliamentary Group;
• Hon. Pen Mogi, MP for Kilak County;
• Hon. Norbert Mao, MP for Gulu Municipality; and
• Justice Onega, Chairman of the Amnesty Commission.

In addition, Government is represented, at District level, by the following:

• Lt. Col. Walter Ochora, LC5 Chairperson for Gulu District;
• Mr. Odok W’Ocheng, Resident District Commissioner, Gulu; and
• Mr. Sylvester Opira, Acting Resident District Commissioner, Kitgum District.

2. The Fundamental Issues

The topic I am to discuss is the ‘Gains and Challenges of Peacemaking’.

The background to all this is, of course, the armed conflict that has been going on in parts of Northern Uganda since 1986/87. Let us remember that, in the 1980s, the conflict virtually covered the whole of northern and eastern zones of Uganda.

I wish to suggest that when the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) seized power in 1986 it was not received uniformly in all parts of Uganda. In areas where it had originally emerged and developed, the NRM/A was received with great welcome and celebration. Such was the case in the Luwero Triangle, which extended through most of Buganda towards the Western districts up to the Ruwenzori Mountains and the borders of the Democratic Republic of Congo, then called Zaire.

In the north and east of Uganda, however, the situation was quite different. Except for Karamoja and Busoga, these areas did not welcome the new administration with the same degree of enthusiasm. In some areas, there was active opposition, leading eventually to armed resistance.

I suggest that basic to this outbreak of hostilities and armed conflict was mutual suspicion. On the part of the local peoples, many saw the new political force (the NRM/A), with its army and government as being composed of persons who had organised against them with the view to destroying them militarily, politically, socially, culturally and economically.

On the other hand, some elements within the new administration harbored fear and suspicion that the local peoples of northern and eastern Uganda were politically hostile to them and were, potentially at least, enemies. It took time to overcome these mutual suspicions. Indeed, even today, the repercussions of this parallel situation remain evident in certain areas.

Over time, however, peace was restored, first in the Lango sub-region, during the late eighties. Then, the Teso sub-region slowly achieved peace through a mass movement, guided by local leaders and facilitated by government efforts. This movement to reject continued warfare and to persuade the armed youth away from rebellion led to peace in the early 1990s. Since then, over the last two to three years, the West Nile sub-region has been steadily joining in the peace process.

I need not remind you that the approach of the government to these conflicts has, during the whole time, oscillated between that of ‘extinguishing fire with fire’ and focusing on dialogue as the way out of armed conflict. For example, in the 1980s, in the Acholi sub-region, the hope was that, through military intervention, the war could be ended. In 1993/94, a dialogue led to peace talks between the government and the rebels. Even then, in 1989, the government negotiated with Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) leading to the signing of a peace accord with Brig. Odong Latek. As a result, a number of UPDA leaders were integrated into various government organs, including the Cabinet. Hon. Mego Betty Bigombe, who was then holding the portfolio I now hold, and the LRM/A leader, Joseph Kony negotiated a possible settlement of the conflict.

Unfortunately, this dialogue did not succeed. I wish to suggest that, once again, mutual fear, suspicion and rancor took control of the situation.

There are two interpretations as to how and why this very commendable effort of 1994 did not attain the ultimate objective of a peace agreement. One view is that the government was not committed to a peaceful solution.

The Nairobi Peace talks (sometimes referred to cynically as ‘the Nairobi Peace Jokes’) and the failure of the Accord that it produced in 1985/86 are most often referred to as proof of the lack of goodwill towards the people of Acholi by the Movement’s leadership. Some have suggested that it is impossible for the current leadership in Uganda to achieve a lasting accommodation with the Acholi community. Such persons cite the experience of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) under Gen. Tito Okello and Gen. Bazilio Okello; Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and now Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army. This is one side of the coin.

The second interpretation, forming the opposite side of the coin, was that the rebels were only using negotiations to reinforce themselves, with a view to launching an offensive aimed at establishing a firm foothold inside Uganda, in the same way as the Sudanese rebels have done inside Sudan.

The truth is there is no shortage of arguments in support of either side. Whether one believes in one or the other interpretation is dependent, not so much on the truth, but on who has the greater capacity to influence a particular individual or group.

However, there is strong consensus that the failure of the negotiations of 1993/94 was a great tragedy for Acholi and Uganda as a whole. Since then, large numbers of people have lost lives, or have been maimed, raped, abducted and lost their properties and homes.

For example, thousands of Acholi children have been abducted, forced to carry out terrible and un-Acholi activities, including killing their own relatives and community members and forcing school girls into involuntary "wives".

Let it be stated that the abduction, rape and forced ‘marriage’ of young girls and women has no cultural basis in Acholi or Lwo culture. This applies equally to virtually all the communities of Northern Uganda. Such practices applied only in the distant past, in times of war and in relation to members of ‘enemy’ communities. In effect, such abducted persons were effectively prisoners of war who were turned into war booty.

After the failure of the 1994 initiative, there was yet another attempt by the two protagonists to resolve the conflict by might. This was particularly illustrated by the Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security chaired by Hon. Ali Gabbe, in 1997. This report recommended the strengthening of the Army as the main focus of the government in resolving the armed conflict in Acholi. The minority report, for its part, also downplayed the role of the military and focused on dialogue and peaceful reconciliation. Nevertheless the Committee was in favour of Amnesty.

What has since come to be accepted is that the two efforts – military and dialogue – must be combined and synchronised towards a final solution through understanding and consensus. In every society, those who do not care about the welfare of the majority require to be convinced that there shall be no gain by the recalcitrance and subjecting the innocent to unnecessary suffering.

3. Recent government measures to end the conflict

I now wish to outline some of the more recent measures – especially since 1998/99 - that the government has undertaken in seeking to resolve this armed conflict. The approach has been in five directions.

The common factors in these conflict resolution efforts are four-fold:

• To enhance the commitment by the local community towards peace, reconciliation and rejection of revenge;
• To reinforce cooperation between the local people with the military, security and other state institutions;
• To enhance the capacity of the military and other state organs to provide an effective response in securing the people and the environment from attacks by rebels and other elements operating outside the law; and
• To avoid negative foreign involvement in the conflict by neighbours and others.

To this end, the efforts of the GoU have focused, first, on internal dialogue. This has been instituted through Peace and Reconciliation Teams established in Kitgum and Gulu districts, bringing together a wide cross-section of stakeholders, ranging from the central and local governments to the various actors within civil society as well as those of goodwill outside the country. The role of Rwodi Moo within these teams, for example, is to participate in the reconciliation process through traditional and cultural approaches.

Secondly, we have the amnesty process. This is intended to go beyond the earlier presidential pardons of the 1980s and early 1990s. The Amnesty Bill arose from the wide-spread demand, and consultation throughout the country, that there must be a comprehensive, all-round and unconditional forgiveness by the government, based on the principle of recognition of wrong done. The Amnesty law was passed by the National Assembly and then signed by the president on January 17, 2000. The Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs recommended selective amnesty in 1997.

It is true that the Amnesty Commission has taken time to begin its full operation. However, the Commission and the national Demobilization and Resettlement Team were appointed by the President and approved by Parliament with the following objectives:

1. To monitor programs for demobilisation and resettlement;
2. To carry out sensitisation and consensus-building with the general public on the Amnesty law;
3. To consider and promote appropriate reconciliation efforts; and
4. To promote dialogue in the spirit of the Amnesty process.

During last financial year, the government released Shs. 400 million for the work of the Commission. The following is the work so far attained:

1. The headquarters of the Commission has been set up in Kampala;
2. The Commission has worked out a draft plan of action and a budget;
3. Advocacy for support to the Amnesty process to strengthen both internal resource mobilisation, notably from central and local governments and external sources, has been carried out;
4. The Commission has visited Acholi sub-region and appointed a person to be in charge of activities there.

However, in addition to the above actions, much still needs to be done, along the following lines:

1. To establish a physical presence of the Commission in Gulu and Kitgum districts, and elsewhere in Uganda as the basis for accomplishing its mission;
2. To establish a concrete working relationship with all stakeholders, at national and local levels, especially with religious leaders, chiefs, NGOs/CBOs, women and youth groups, elders, etc.;
3. To explain the Amnesty law clearly to the local people in all parts of Acholi;
4. To explain the Amnesty process to those engaged in the armed conflict, notably the rebel leadership and the rank and file;
5. To build consensus with Acholi people in the Diaspora, such as Kacoke Madit, Acholi Association, Wider Consultation on Uganda (WICU) and other organisations of Ugandans abroad;
6. To increase resource mobilisation for the work of the Commission; and
7. To streamline and provide for psychosocial rehabilitation and resettlement of persons wishing to benefit from the Amnesty, including packages to help integrate them economically.

In complement to the efforts aimed at building consensus and unity among the Acholi people and the Amnesty process, the government has engaged in Dialogue with the Government of Sudan. This has been carried out in many foreign capitals with the support or mediation of countries of goodwill. The following have mediated or, in one way or another, provided a venue for support to this effort to improve relations between Sudan and Uganda: Britain (London), Italy (Rome), Germany (Bonn), Austria, Iran, Egypt, Libya, Togo (Lome), Kenya (Nairobi), USA (Atlanta and New York) and Canada (Winnipeg). It is an impressive if not exhaustive list!

The two most important recent initiatives have been:

1. The mediation by the Carter Centre that produced the Nairobi Accord on December 8, 1999. The implementation of this Accord has been reviewed in talks in Nairobi, Atlanta, New York, Kampala and Khartoum (at technical level); and
2. The Winnipeg Communiqué that was negotiated during a conference organized by the Government of Canada in September 2000. The first review meeting under this initiative was scheduled for November 30, 2000 in Khartoum. It was, however aborted by Sudan’s last minute message to Canada that it would not participate, thereby causing a cancellation by Canada. At the time, the Ugandan delegates and those of other countries and international agencies, were already on their way to Khartoum.

4. Achievements of the Peace Process

What have been some of the major achievements of the dialogue between Uganda and Sudan? The following, in my view, constitute some of them:

• First of all, within the context of such bitter feelings and a long period of hostilities, talking itself must be counted as an achievement. It has kept the doors open and hopes alive amidst the gloom of suffering.
• Secondly, the Nairobi Peace Accord of December 1999 was an achievement insofar as it produced a clear point of reference between the two countries for action.
• Thirdly, a number of countries and international agencies have been brought into the process of mediating between Uganda and Sudan and monitoring the performance or lack of performance of the parties to the conflict. Where necessary, pressure has been put on Uganda and Sudan to implement what they have agreed to do. In this way, the guilty party emerges ever more clearly in the eyes of the international community and world opinion.
• Fourthly, a small number of Ugandan citizens have been returned to Uganda although, as we all know not a single one, not even abducted children, has been brought back to Uganda from the camps of LRA in Sudan.
• Fifth, and to the benefit of Sudan, Uganda has returned all Sudanese prisoners of war and the circumstances of the death of three POWs.
• Sixth, Uganda has invited the Governments of Egypt and Libya to come and help monitor the Uganda-Sudan border so as to verify Sudanese complaints of alleged Ugandan support to SPLM/A. No one should use this unverified support to explain Sudan’s failure to implement its part of the Accord. Although the outbreak of the Ebola epidemic has temporarily postponed the start of the operations of the Joint Observation Team, it has recently been agreed that the team will come to Uganda and initially stay in Kampala. I wish to state that the GoU is keen to expose the lies and excuses of Sudan that it is not relocating, disarming and disbanding LRA camps and not releasing our abducted persons - especially those innocent children – due to Uganda’s support to Sudanese rebels. This is why we wish that the Libyan-Egyptian Observer Team comes quickly and does its work.

5. Challenges to the Peace Process

What are the challenges to the peace process in relation to Uganda-Sudan relations? Among these, we may identify the following:

• The fundamental challenge of disarming, relocating and disbanding rebels in Sudan; and
• That of rescuing and repatriating all abducted persons.

For these to be accomplished, we need a clear demonstration by Sudan of political will and commitment to the Nairobi Accord. I wish to state that the Government of Uganda is fully committed to implement all agreements with Sudan as our record clearly demonstrates.

Experience shows the need for adequate involvement and pressure from the international community, and from Ugandan and Sudanese citizens, in favour of implementing all agreements and understandings reached towards normalising the relations between the two countries. Without this, one party continues to implement the agreement while the other doesn’t. It takes two to build a healthy relationship.

I wish to mention particularly the immediate challenge of establishing direct contact between the GoU and members of the Acholi community with the leadership of LRA. There is need to talk to Joseph Kony, the LRM/A leader, to directly explain to him and his team the functioning of the Amnesty. It clear that these people need reassurance about what ‘timo kica’, including ‘mato oput’, involves towards reconciliation and the integration of the rebels into Acholi society.

I now turn to dialogue with the rebels as one pillar of the objective of reconciliation.

Some people have, indeed, questioned from time to time whether the Ugandan government is committed to dialogue with rebels. I wish to reiterate, once again, that the Government of Uganda is truly committed to direct dialogue with LRA and all other rebels in search for genuine and lasting peace.

• In West Nile, this dialogue is already taking place. In fact, there is a tacit understanding that has resulted in no serious fighting for more than two years now.
• In Acholi, the original position of the LRM/A was one of extreme lack of trust of the Ugandan government and, on that basis, total unwillingness to have any direct dialogue with the government. This position is contained in the various statements, taped messages, video recordings and other means of communication assumed to be coming from the LRA leadership, including Joseph Kony himself.

Government has not been deterred in its endeavor for direct dialogue with the LRM/A.

• The Government of Uganda, at very high levels, has offered the olive branch to the LRM/A leadership through various channels of communication. None has been positively responded to.
• With Government support and encouragement, contacts have been tried by various sections of Acholi society, including religious leaders, chiefs and traditional leaders as well as elected leaders. They have all been frustrated by lack of visas to Sudan. In fact two Acholi traditional leaders/elders were inside Uganda while trying to broker peace with the rebels in the bush. Moreover, the LRM/A leader’s second in command, Otti Lagony (brother of the late Mzee Lagony), simply disappeared in Sudan. He was reportedly killed, on orders from the LRM/A leadership, together with his suspected followers, for seeking to find a more accommodating approach to the settlement of the current armed conflict.
• Even the Carter Center brokered two visits by the family members of the LRM/A leader unsuccessfully. Twice were his parents taken to Sudan, twice the LRM/A leader failed to show up! What other channels can the Government of Uganda use to reach direct dialogue with the LRA leadership?

It is not always clear who is really behind the frustration of these peace efforts: the LRM/A leadership or the Sudanese government. This is because it is the Sudanese government that is in direct contact with the LRM/A leadership and reports what they allegedly think and say.

Some have speculated that the LRA – as a fighting force – is too important for certain factions within the Sudanese government and Army, in the defense of Juba and the oil fields of Upper Nile. Both of them are under direct threat from the current intensified SPLM/A offensives. If this is so, it does not make the search for dialogue with the LRM/A any easier!

5. Social and Economic Welfare of the People

Government has been conscious of the need to make life more bearable to the people of Acholi, even in the midst of the current conflict and insecurity.

• First, Government continues to work towards improving the lives of the 400,000 or so Acholi who are displaced within Gulu and Kitgum and to other districts, especially Masindi district. Food is being supplied together with other items of necessity, as well as social infrastructure within and around the camps themselves, such as improved roads, health, and water and sanitation facilities. The supplies have come either directly from the government through the Ministry of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees in the Office of the Prime Minister or through international agencies and NGOs, especially the UN World Food Programme. The government not only calls for greater international support to IDPs but also welcomes, registers and facilitates their operations.
• Secondly, the government has tried over the years to continue providing services through the line ministries to Acholi sub-region. These cover power, telephone and television facilities, roads and bridges, health facilities and many others.
• Thirdly, a special Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURPI), an emergency rehabilitation programme, was instituted in 1991/92 to provide additional services for the concerned communities. This programme covered nine distinct areas including agriculture, urban and town planning, construction of markets, provision of urban, rural water facilities and community capacity building.

Under NURP II, certain projects that were not carried out, or not completed under the first phase, are being continued. These include the northern telecommunications project supported by the Belgian Government with a US$4.5 million grant; and a loan from the Nordic Development Fund of US$7 million. Also the Atiak-Adjumani road is being rehabilitated and improved using the El Nino fund.

The other component of NURP II is the Restocking Project. Last year, the government had put 18 billion Shs for restocking in 35 districts (14 in northern Uganda, five in Eastern Uganda and 16 in Luwero Triangle). Although some of the money had to be channeled towards dealing with armed pastoral elements in North-eastern Uganda, this year an additional 5 billion Shs was budgeted for the same project. The implementation of the project is in full gear and corrective measures are being taken on an on-going basis.

One important feature of the Restocking Project is that in Gulu and Kitgum, the president decided to make special arrangements for 50 youths per district to benefit in a special way by establishing group herding, combined with training in agricultural and other skills, so as to develop their capacity to improve their family incomes.

The planning for NURP II started with a District Profile Survey by COWI Consultants, which prepared the ground for District Consultation Workshops culminating in a National Consensus Workshop (October 1999). This month, another workshop has been held in Soroti to adopt the Project Concept Document based on the social fund approach.

The idea is to put the communities at the centre of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. It is expected that the social fund approach will enable us to start implementation early in 2001, with certain interventions that can be used to learn and develop the programme further, as we progress. This will be financed through a Project Preparation Facility (PPF) that will steadily grow towards full implementation during the next five years. The World Bank and the government have already agreed to make up to US$100 million available during the lifetime of the project.

Ebola

I wish to say something about the outbreak of the Ebola epidemic in Gulu and its consequences for the peace process. It is now agreed that the first cases were identified in Lacor and Gulu Hospitals from patients living in and around Gulu municipality. As soon as it was identified that this was the Ebola epidemic, the government, through the Ministry of Health, moved speedily to put in place the diagnostic, treatment and care infrastructure. The government released an initial 50 million shillings for this purpose even before it proceeded to make a special appeal to the international community for support. This government contribution is growing all the time and today stands close to 100 million shillings.

Special prevention and management efforts that have accompanied these arrangements involved the establishment of a District Ebola Task Force, headed by the chairperson of LC5 Executive, a National Technical Task Force chaired by the Ministry of Health and a Cabinet sub-committee chaired by the minister for General Duties in the Office of the Prime Minister.

It is now generally recognised that the way Uganda has managed the outbreak of the Ebola epidemic constitutes one of the shining examples of best practice, just as it did with HIV/AIDS. The thrust of this approach involves openness and transparency in information sharing; a multisectoral approach; the mobilisation of the communities up to the village level; the fast development of the technical capacity of the districts and institutions to handle all aspects of the epidemic; input of resources from within the country and a solid back-up by the international community.

I take this opportunity to express appreciation to the Acholi community in the Diaspora for their response by mobilising themselves and others towards making contributions to the fight against Ebola. What has happened is that a whole range of supplies has been dispatched by these Ugandans abroad, especially in Europe and North America, through Lacor and Gulu Hospitals. We are at the stage of strengthening the coordination of these efforts through the Ministry of Health and WHO.

8. The Way Forward towards Peace and Reconciliation.

In conclusion, we need to bring out a few summary points. What is clear is that the account we have laid out points to a very complex way forward in our common search for a just and sustainable peace and reconciliation. I would summaries them in terms of the following elements:

First, we have to work together to foster the spirit of dialogue within Uganda in order to strengthen the unity of our people: in Acholi, between the Acholi and all their neighbours and between the peoples of Northern Uganda and the rest of Uganda. Secondly, it is our resolve to work to foster dialogue between Ugandans inside and outside the country. KM can and should play a major role as the bridge, by being truthful, engaging all the parties on the basis of principles, combining the immediate and longer-term considerations, and focusing on peace and development.

In the third place, the Governments of Sudan and Uganda should engage each other in ensuring the implementation of the Nairobi Accord. Less than a week ago, a meeting took place here in Nairobi. It was agreed to dispatch a joint delegation to Sudan to meet the LRM/A leader and his team, in order to seek their support towards the process of relocation, disarmament and disbandment. Frankly, many continue to doubt whether this joint delegation will meet Kony and succeed in its task of preparing the ground for an end to the hostilities in Northern Uganda. Some fear that, like with many previous arrangements between the two parties, the Government of Sudan will not allow this joint visit to talk with the LRA leadership to start with.

The argument is that certain factions of the Sudanese leadership need Kony politically and militarily to strengthen themselves. Also, such skeptics suggest that the Sudanese Army – especially those in the South – need the LRA as a fighting force. I sincerely wish and hope that these predictions will be proved wrong.

I appeal to the Government of Sudan to work with the Government of Uganda and the concerned countries and institutions so as to ensure the success of this initiative.

Fourth, it is the intention of the Government of Uganda to utilise the Winnipeg Initiative facilitated by Canada within the overall framework of the Nairobi Accord in order to gain the speedy release and repatriation of all abducted children. To this end, Uganda has even responded to Sudan’s various concerns. For example, Uganda has promised that, if Sudan does provide evidence of the presence of any abducted Sudanese children on Ugandan soil, we shall work with the relevant international agencies to effect their repatriation on a voluntary basis. And we have sought the cooperation of other countries to assist in this process. The issue of the release of the former abducted children is not political. It is humanitarian.

Finally, the overall objective of the Government of Uganda in taking all these measures is to create a war-to-peace situation for rehabilitation, reconstruction and long-term sustainable development in Northern Uganda and the rest of the country. Let us work together towards this end!