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Carter
Centre Presentation
I would like to thank Kacoke Madit on behalf of President Carter and The Carter Centre for the invitation to be with you over this weekend and to share some of our experience of involvement in the peace process as candidly as possible. But as I told Patrick Otto when I accepted the invitation, I am primarily charged with listening, learning and taking your advice on how to attain as quickly as possible lasting peace in Acholi. We recognize the enormous contribution Kacoke Madit has made and will continue to make in the search for sustained peace in northern Uganda and very much value the collective wisdom and dedication of the organisation and the many strands of Acholi society that it represents. For The Carter Centre, the search for peace is a Ugandan and Sudanese undertaking that we can only assist in a limited way and only if the principal parties are committed to its success. At this point, we believe success hinges on whether we can all now work together to constructively engage Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army in bringing the war to an end and healing the wounds created by almost a decade and a half of violence. For those of you who are not familiar with the framework The Carter Centre is working within, I would like to briefly summarize the relevant elements of the Nairobi Agreement that was reached in early December 1999. But first, it should be noted that our involvement was in response to a request from President Museveni to help with the problem in the north. However, any attempt to bring peace to Acholi was and remains contingent on the cooperation of the Government of Sudan. To obtain the cooperation of Sudan, the approach had to also address other bilateral issues, hence the structure of the Nairobi Agreement. The parties to the agreement are the Governments of Uganda and Sudan. Presidents Museveni and Bashir are the signatories. The Government of Kenya, through President Moi, and The Carter Centre -- through former U.S. President Jimmy Carter -- witnessed the agreement. It committed the main parties to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other, to renounce the use of force to resolve differences, and to take steps to prevent hostile actions against the other. It also committed Uganda and Sudan to make every effort to disband and disarm terrorist groups, to prevent acts of terrorism against the other and not to harbour, sponsor, give logistical or military support to rebel groups, opposition groups, or hostile elements from each others’ territory. Parallel to that was a commitment to promote regional peace in support of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) role in bringing an end to the civil war in Sudan.
The parties were also to refrain from hostile and negative propaganda against each other and return all prisoners of war. And they condemned the abuse of innocent citizens, and committed themselves to make special efforts to locate abductees, especially children, and return them to their families. They agreed as well to offer amnesty and reintegration assistance to all former combatants who renounce the use of force. If the other terms of the agreement were met, Uganda and Sudan expressed a desire to re-establish normal relations. Since December 1999, the parties have met on a number of occasions to reaffirm their commitment to the Nairobi process and to work together to flesh out the details of implementation. Prisoners of war have been released and some escapees from the LRA have been returned to Uganda. At the same time efforts have been made to communicate with and engage the leadership of the LRA/M in the peaceful resolution of the conflict. In Uganda, the Amnesty Act has been promulgated and the Acholi community has renewed its efforts to prepare the ground for a lasting solution. As this process has proceeded, it has been joined in a variety of ways by other governments and institutions. In Nairobi, between November 17 and 19, ministers and officials from Uganda and Sudan were convened by The Carter Centre to assess with us and reaffirm commitments to full implementation of the agreement. Also present and directly involved in the discussions were the governments of Libya, Egypt, and Canada, as well as representatives from UNICEF. The principal issue under discussion in Nairobi was how to accelerate meaningful discussion with Joseph Kony and the LRA/M. To that end, it was agreed that senior representatives of Sudan, Uganda, Egypt, Libya, Canada, UNICEF and The Carter Centre, as well as a representative of the Acholi community in Uganda, will seek to meet with the LRA/M leadership as soon as possible. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss peaceful means of relocating, disarming and disbanding the Lord’s Resistance Army and the voluntary repatriation to Uganda of all who wish to return home. For those who do not wish to return to Uganda, this will be an opportunity to discuss what other options may be available. In a little more detail, subjects for discussion are:
The guiding principles for this meeting and what could stem from it are:
Depending on the outcome of this meeting, it is likely that further meetings will be necessary with the LRA/M, involving representatives of the Acholi community, the Government of Uganda, the Government of Sudan and others. Meanwhile, a reception centre is to be established in Juba to receive and process LRA/M members. At the same time, we expect to see a start on the construction of a larger temporary transit camp for LRA/M members. That, in essence, is where we are at now, and the message that we hope can be conveyed to Joseph Kony. The Nairobi process and The Carter Centre have been criticised for not engaging Joseph Kony from the start. That was not for lack of trying. The Carter Centre has all along believed that the involvement of the LRA was desirable. However, we were unable to persuade Joseph Kony or a representative to attend the initial Nairobi meeting. Subsequently, The Carter Centre made considerable efforts to talk with Joseph Kony about his options. This included two direct meetings facilitated by the Government of Sudan. Another meeting with family members failed to take place, when Joseph Kony would not travel to Juba for the meeting. Other proposed confidence-building measures, including a meeting requested by Kony with Acholi elders and religious leaders, also did not take place. With little apparent progress, the Government of Sudan has come under increasing pressure to take action against the LRA/M and to remove it from Sudan. But Sudanese efforts have been met with growing suspicion on the part of the LRA/M, creating more obstacles to communication and engagement in dialogue. The lack of constructive dialogue with the LRA and the continuation of the violence are obviously of deep concern to all of us. We sincerely hope that the proposed meeting with Joseph Kony and the LRA/M leadership will provide an opportunity for frank and detailed discussion about the peaceful resolution of the conflict. All concerned want to send a common message to Joseph Kony that dialogue presents the best route out of the bush for himself and the LRA/M. The Governments of Uganda and Sudan are in agreement on this. The governments of Libya, Egypt and Canada support this approach. We know that these parties, The Carter Centre, UNICEF and others are ready and willing to ensure that a peaceful long-term resolution of the conflict is achieved and sustained. Perhaps even more importantly, it is essential that the Acholi community in Uganda and outside Uganda get the message across that there is a willingness to accept members of the LRA/M back into Acholi society and to put an end to the bloodshed and destruction. That also implies that what is already in place and the positive experiences of those who have returned to Uganda are communicated effectively and consistently to those in the bush in northern Uganda and in southern Sudan. If the mechanisms and processes planned or already in place for rehabilitation, reintegration, and reconciliation need improvement or expansion, lobbying constructively for those improvements in an open and transparent way can also send a hugely powerful message to the LRA/M.
In conclusion, I would like to ask for your understanding that The Carter Centre and others are engaged in an extremely sensitive, difficult, and complex process where the wishes of confidentiality of those most directly involved must be respected. In other words, there may be some questions that even though I may think I know the answer I won’t be able to respond to. I apologise in advance for any feelings of frustration that might cause. Thank you for your kind attention.
David Lord Regional Representative The Carter Centre |
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